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RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT 
OF FACTS 
1 Appellant's factual statement m paragraph 8 is not contrary to the portion 
of the record quoted by MJ Taylor Ms Ta\ lor is not required to quote verbatim the 
court transcripts and pleadings to satisfy the requirement to marshal the evidence 
2 Appellant's factual statement m paragraph 8 is not contrary to the portion 
of the record quoted by Mr Taylor Ms Ta\lor is not required to quote verbatim the 
court transcripts and pleadings to satisfy the requirement to marshal the evidence 
3 At the place in the record cited. Mi Taylor referenced her communications 
with Mr Florence which included concerns about Mr Taylor being unemployed and 
taking the children out of the country (R 02015.02008) Ms Taylor further expressed 
to the Court the additional concerns shared with Mr Florence, which concerns even more 
strongly support Ms Taylor's position that there was not sufficient evidence in the record 
to hold her in contempt 
4. Ms. Taylor cited to page 2095 of the record for the facts stated, not 2075 as 
Mr Taylor contends. This citation is accurate More importantly. Mr. Taylor does not 
dispute this fact and is therefore merely wasting the Court's time with such trivialities 
5. Appellant's factual statement in paragraph 44 accurately reflects her 
statement to the court. She did not believe that this notation would prevent Mr. Taylor 
from obtaining a passport for the minor child because she had been told by the passport 
office that federal law requires only consent form one parent if there is a court order in 
place. 
6 Although Ms Taylor did state on more than one occasion that Mr 1 a\ lor 
could get a passport for the minor children without her consent b\ presenting a copy of 
the court order, not all of these communications are found the record Ms Taylor did 
however, inform the court of this fact before she was sent to jail 
7 There is no record cite in paragraph 47 because the passport was obtained 
after the record was complete Mr Taylor does not dispute that he was able to obtain a 
passport for the minor child based on the documents presented and is again merely 
wasting this Court's time with such objections 
8 As set forth in Ms Taylor's brief, the facts establish compliance with the 
Court's order As such, the disputed statement is fact, not argument 
9 The recitation of facts in paragraph 51 is entirely supported by the portion 
of the record cited and quoted by Mr Taylor Ms Taylor did not use the term 
"tendering" as a term of law but merely to communicate the fact that Ms Taylor had 
made numerous attempts to get the check into Mr Taylor's hands As addressed below, 
the email referenced by Mr Taylor does not contradict the fact that the check was ready 
within the time period provided 
10 The verbatim text of Ms Taylor's statements is actually set forth in 
paragraph 5 of Mr. Taylor's objections, not paragraph 4 Regardless, the factual 
statement in paragraph 52 accurately reflects Ms Taylor's statement to the court. 
11. As set forth in Ms. Taylor's brief, the facts establish compliance with the 
Court's order As such, the disputed statement is fact, not argument. 
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12. It is undisputed that Ms. Taylor spent 30 days in jail for contempt. Ms. 
Taylor is awaiting the outcome of this appeal before paying the fine and attorneys* fees. 
OBJEC I JON 1 0 APPELLEE'S SI A 11.MEN I OF M l IS 
Mr. Taylor has improperly recited his version of the entii e history oi'this six-year 
case when the only issues on appeal concern the district court's holding Ms. Taylor in 
contempt in January 2010 for failing to timely pay S4 i Taylor and for failing 
to purge that contempt by paying $41
 r000 to Mr. i • . * a 
passport for the minor children. None of the additional facts cited by Mr. Iay lor are 
relevant to these issues on appeal and should not be considered by the Court. 
]. MS. I A V I O R MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE R E L E V A J S i i U n i r 
ISSUES ON APPEAL. 
iy issues on appeal relate to the district court's holding Ms. Taylor in 
contempt of couit in i espouse to the Lou 
squarely admits in his statement of facts that J;c vmy luu icason^ lor winch he auught 
contempt against Ms I aylor in his Countermotion were for allegedly "failing and 
refusing tii i mnpK v ih tin Spm i.il Maula u< poll and < »MUJ» lh.it she cooperate in 
obtaining the daughter's passport and for failing and idusiiiy lo pay Mr I nylni I he sum 
of $41,000, on or before January 1, 2010." (App'ee Br; at 2J \ ~;., He further admits 
\ rea^oi
 tl x lor was held in contempt at the January Hearing wa for 
failing in •. ^ : i .
 : /. . ••:* • «-h.-r admits 
that the district court conditioned purging uf the u>; 
$41,000 debt and gelling a passport for the minor child. (App'ee Br. at. 51 ) Ms Taylor 
has marshaled all of the evidence in the record relating to these two discrete issues of 
payment of the S41.000 debt and the passport. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Taylor contends that Ms. Taylor failed to marshal the evidence 
because she did not recite the entire history of this case from the filing of the Petition for 
Divorce in 2005 through the date that Judge Henriod sent Ms. Taylor to jail in February 
2010. Yet. Mr. Taylor alleges that the $41.000 payment was not due until January 1. 
2010. As noted above, these issues were first raised with the Court in the Countermotion 
filed on January 15, 2010. 
Furthermore, Judge Henriod was not even assigned to this case until April 29, 
2008—three years after the Petition was filed. Judge Henriod had no knowledge 
whatsoever of the prior case history that Mr. Taylor now alleges formed the primary basis 
for his contempt ruling. The issue of payment of the $41.000 debt and the passport for 
the minor child were first raised before him on January 1 5, 2010. 
Regardless, the elaborate case "history" which Mr. Taylor purports to summarize 
is entirely one-sided and does not go to the issue of contempt at all. One cannot be held 
in contempt for being represented by any number of different attorneys or by acting pro 
se. (App'ee Br. at 41-43.) Many of the "facts" Mr. Taylor alleges against Ms. Taylor 
arise out of her attempts to represent herself and to file documents and pleadings that she 
believed to be appropriate in order to protect her interests and those of her children. Id. 
At best, the allegations against her may be grounds for sanctions—not contempt and a jail 
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sentence 1 ellingly. none of these alleged misdeeds is mentioned in Mr 1 a\ lor s 
Countermotion for contempt 
Furthermore, although the court failed to enter findings after holding Ms Taylor in 
contempt at the January Hearing, the findings eventually entered by the court after the 
February Hearing do not support Mr Taylor's argument that the contempt ruling was 
based on the entire history of the case There is nothing whatsoever in those findings that 
in any way ties the finding of contempt to the entire history of the case To the contrary, 
the sole basis for contempt as set forth m that ruling is Ms Ta\lor's failure to pay 
$41,000 to Mr. Taylor by January 1 Mr Taylor's counsel prepared these findings and 
cannot now argue that there was more to the court's ruling than is found in those 
findings 
Mr Taylor's unnecessary and irrelevant recitation of his one-sided view of the 
history of this case appears to be merely an attempt to portray Ms. Taylor in an 
unfavorable light before this Court There is no question that this has been a highly 
contested divorce case by both parties. There is no doubt conduct on both sides that has 
been less than exemplary. However, the Court need not sort through the minutia of what 
has transpired between them over the last six years in order to review the correctness of 
Judge Henriod's ruling on Mr. Taylor's Countermotion. 
1
 Although the findings do reference certain past conduct of Ms. Taylor in "constantly 
changing counsel, representing herself, and putting Petitioner in a position where he had 
to pay legal fees for emails and telephone calls between Respondent and Petitioner's 
counsel,'5 these findings were directly and solely related to the award of attorneys" fees 
and costs to Mr. Taylor. (R. 02133.) These findings were entirely unconnected to the 
finding of contempt and rightly so. Such conduct is not a basis for contempt under the 
statute. 
It was Mr. Taylor's Countermotion requesting a finding of contempt against Ms 
Taylor, solely on the two discrete issues set forth therein, that was noticed for hearing and 
considered by the court Nothing in that Countermotion made any reference whatsoever 
of the prior case history or any of the ^facts'* Mr. Taylor now recites in his appellate 
brief. 
Ms. Taylor represented herself pro se at that hearing and came prepared to address 
only those two issues ]f. as Mr. Taylor now claims. Judge Henriod held Ms Taylor in 
contempt for all that had transpired over the last six years (including the three years 
before he was assigned to the case), then Ms. Taylor was not given proper notice or the 
opportunity to defend herself The ruling should be overturned on that basis alone 
[The Utah Supreme] Court and the United States Supreme 
Court have held that an individual's constitutional rights must 
be protected during a contempt of court action. To satisfy an 
essential requisite of procedural due process, a hearing must 
be prefaced by timely notice which adequately informs the 
parties of the specific issues they must prepare to meet. 
Homeyer v. Stagg & Assocs. (In re Cannatella), 2006 UT App 89. ^3 (Utah Ct. App. 
2006) (internal citations omitted). 
The sole grounds set forth in Mr. Taylor's Countermotion in support of his 
demand that Ms. Taylor be held in contempt were the two discrete issues of the passport 
and the $41,000 payment identified therein and briefed by Ms. Taylor on appeal. The 
court held Ms. Taylor in contempt only for failing to pay the $41.000 debt and then 
incorrectly held that she had failed to satisfy the two conditions for purging the contempt: 
timely payment of the $41,000 debt and getting passports for the minor children. Ms. 
6 
1 a\ lor has marshaled all of the evidence related to these issues and pointed the Court to 
the rele\ ant documents m the record Nothing more is required 
11. THE ISSUES ON APPEAL ARE NOT MOOT. 
Mr Taylor cannot seriously argue that the issue of whether Ms Taylor was 
properly held m contempt is moot simply because she has already served her jail 
sentence Were that the case, all criminal convictions carrying a brief sentence would be 
moot and therefore unappealable Were Mr Taylor correct, one would expect to find a 
plethora of cases on this point, yet Mr Taylor notably has not cited to any. 
Mr Taylor has also cited no case law in support of his position that a contempt 
ruling is unappealable once the jail sentence has been served. In fact, the relevant case 
law is to the contrary In Barton v. Barton. 2001 UT App. 199, the Court considered an 
appeal of a contempt ruling imposing a two-day jail sentence in a custody dispute. In 
setting forth the facts of that case, the Court noted as follows: "Mother served the jail 
time. This appeal followed." Id. ^6. The appeal was not moot simply because it was not 
filed prior to completion of the two-day jail sentence. In fact, the Court directly 
considered and ruled on the correctness of the contempt ruling on appeal. 
Furthermore, Mr. Taylor's position is simply untenable. The Order on the 
February Hearing was not signed and entered until March 15, 2010—after Ms. Taylor 
had already served her entire jail sentence. Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, a notice of appeal can only be filed from a final order or judgment. 
Therefore, it was legally impossible for Ms. Taylor to appeal the Court's contempt ruling 
until after she had served her entire jail sentence Surely Mi Taylor does not suggest that 
this is the law. 
Even though Ms. Taylor has served the full jail sentence imposed, and cannot get 
that time back, she still wishes to clear her name by having the contempt ruling vacated. 
She is a pediatric dentist with a professional reputation to protect. She would like to have 
her name cleared and is entitled to have her case heard by this Court. Additionally, Mr. 
Taylor has conceded that the civil contempt fine and award of attorneys* fees are not 
moot. 
11). THE ADEQUACY OF THE FINDINGS WAS PROPERLY PRESERVED. 
The district court ruled that Ms. Taylor was in contempt at the January Hearing. 
At that hearing, and in the relevant briefing, Ms. Taylor was acting pro se. She 
repeatedly disputed Mr. Taylor's characterizations of her conduct as supporting a finding 
of contempt. She specifically disputed the facts necessary to find that she had met the 
elements of contempt, including that she knew what was required of her and had willfully 
and knowingly failed and refused to comply. 
No findings were prepared or entered following the January Hearing. Therefore, 
there was no opportunity for Ms. Taylor to challenge the findings or file a Rule 59 
motion, as asserted by Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor's argument that Ms. Taylor has therefore 
waived her right to appeal the contempt ruling at the January Hearing creates yet another 
impossible situation for Ms. Taylor to resolve. 
At the time of the February Hearing, no findings had yet been prepared or entered. 
Immediately following the February Hearing, Ms. Taylor was sent to jail. While in jail, 
8 
she filed a Petition for txtraordinan Relief thai specificalh raised the tact that the 
district court had failed to enter adequate findings and conclusions of law Her Petition 
was denied 
Mr Taylor nevertheless takes issue with the fact that Ms Ta)lor did not object to 
the proposed findings following the Februan Hearing Yet these findings accurate!) 
represented the rulings of the Court at the Februan Hearing Under Rule 7 Ms Taylor 
had no basis whatsoever for objecting to the proposed findings Once the findings 
conclusions, and the final order were entered a month after the February Hearing Ms 
Taylor timel> filed her notice of appeal Ms Taylor did all that was required of her to 
preserve the issues on appeal, particularly given the fact that she was acting pro se at the 
time of both hearings 
The case law on which Mr Taylor relies is not on point Ms Ta\lor is contesting 
the sufficiency of the evidence necessary to support a finding of contempt As set forth 
in detail below, the evidence in the record, and reflected in the court's findings, do not 
provide "clear and convincing proof" of the three elements of contempt Ms Taylor is 
further contesting the fact that no findings were entered following the January contempt 
ruling, not that the findings that were entered were inadequate Furthermore, the findings 
entered following the February Hearing were not inadequate because they accurately 
represented what the judge had ruled at the February Hearing Given the evidence in the 
record and the judge's rulings at the hearings, the findings could not have been any 
different that what they were. They accurately reflected the court's ruling Therefore. 
there was nothing which Ms. Taylor could challenge. 
IV. THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF CONTEMPT. 
In order to hold Ms. Taylor in contempt for failing to pay the $41.000 by the 
original deadline, the Court was required to find "by clear and convincing proof* that 
Ms Taylor "willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do* what she knew she was 
required to do and had the ability to do. Sinclair v. Sinclair. 718 P.2d 396. 398 (Utah 
1986) (emphasis added). The Court did not do so. and could not do so. based on the facts 
in the record. 
First, the facts do not show by clear and convincing proof that, despite her 
communications with Mr. Taylor about an extension of time. Ms. Taylor knew she was 
required to pay the amount owed by January 1. 2010. The simple fact that Ms. Taylor 
knew that the original deadline for payment was January 1 does not establish that she 
knew the deadline had not been extended. Parties and their counsel agree to extend 
court-ordered deadlines all the time. The evidence shows that this is precisely what Ms. 
Taylor believed had occurred. 
In her opening brief. Ms. Taylor recited to a litany of facts showing that she had 
been attempting to arrange a later date of payment with Mr. Taylor so that she could use 
the proceeds from the pending sale of her business and understood that Mr. Taylor was 
2
 To the extent that Mr. Taylor is correct that Ms. Taylor was required to file a Rule 59 
motion in order to preserve this issue on appeal, this would be hypertechnical trap for pro 
se litigants and counsel alike. There is nothing within the text of this or any other rule of 
procedure to put parties on notice that they must file a Rule 59 motion prior to appealing 
the case, particularly in light of the fact that Rule 59 motions are purely optional. 
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amenable 10 ihat In fact Mr Ta\lor s counsel responded by asking her to send a copy ol 
the proposed release so thai she could expedite the sale of her business Never once did 
either Mr Tavlor or his counsel object to Ms Taylor's requested extension or demand 
immediate payment Instead the) filed a motion to have Ms Taylor held in contempt 
Second the facts before ludge Henriod do not show by clear and convincing proof 
that she had the ability to pay that amount due Although Mi Taylor attempts to rely on 
the fact that she later paid the full amount, this took place well after the January Hearing 
where Ms Ta\ lor was held in contempt ludge Henriod therefore had no evidence before 
him that Ms Taylor was able to pav at the time he held her in contempt The mere fact 
that Ms Taylor did not deny that she had the ability to pay is not the same as evidence in 
the record affirmatively demonstrating that she did. particularly when this issue was 
never raised or considered by the judge 
Third, the facts do not establish ltby clear and convincing proof that Ms Taylor 
acted willfully and knowingly in failing or refusing to do what was required of her To 
the contrary, the only facts in the record show that Ms Taylor intended to pay the full 
amount owed, acted in good faith in requesting that Mr Taylor agree to a later payment 
date, and made repeated, timely efforts to make the necessary arrangements The facts 
further show that Mr Taylor and his counsel gave the appearance of being amenable to 
these requests and never gave any indication otherwise until the filing of the 
Countermotion for contempt against Ms Taylor. 
Mr. Taylor's half-hearted attempt to argue that the record supports a finding of 
contempt is indicative of the weakness of the argument. In response to the numerous 
facts identified by Ms. Taylor in her brief Mr. Taylor makes only a conclusory statement 
that "Ms. Taylor knew what she was required to do (which she admitted), whether she 
had the ability to do so (which she never denied and in fact paid the money just shy of the 
time limit) and whether she failed to pay it to M J . Taylor by January 1. 2010. (which she 
admitted she did not do.)** (App'ee Br. at 48.) This is not even an accurate statement of 
the elements of contempt, in particular the requirement of willfulness, much less a 
satisfactory recitation of facts from the record supporting a finding of contempt "by clear 
and convincing proof under the necessary' elements. 
Mr. Taylor cannot simply ignore all of the evidence in the record demonstrating 
that Ms. Taylor reasonably believed that the January7 ] deadline had been extended and 
then blindly condemn her for failing to meet it. The court was required to find "by clear 
and convincing proof* that Ms. Taylor willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do 
what she knew was required of her. Based on the evidence in the record, it could not 
have done so. Therefore, the Court wrongly held Ms. Taylor in contempt for failing to 
meet a deadline that she thought had been extended. 
V. THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COURT'S RULING THAT 
MS. TAYLOR FAILED TO SATISFY THE CONDITIONS FOR PURGING 
THE CONTEMPT. 
The court also could not have found by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. 
Taylor willfully and knowingly failed to meet the conditions for purging the contempt. 
The district court conditioned purging of the contempt on two things: payment of $41,000 
to Mr. Taylor within 24 hours and getting a passport for the minor children. 
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First. Ms Taylor testified at the hearing that she had the S41.000 kkread> within 24 
hours** (R 02 ]] 8 at 3 4 ) This is directly reflected in the findings, which state 
"Respondent stated that she had the check ready within 24 hours at her accountant's 
office but did not know the Petitioner would not pick it up " (R 02133 ) There is 
nothing in the findings to contradict this fact/ 
Additionally, the evidence in the record further demonstrates that Ms Taylor 
made every possible effort to deliver it to Mr Taylor within the 24-hour period She 
contacted Mr. Taylor's counsel to arrange delivery but did not receive a response until 
after the time period had passed. Mr Taylor's counsel told her she could deliver it the 
next morning and that only "if this does not occur** did she "intend to call Judge Henriod. 
as 1 was instructed to do. and have him issue the bench warrant for Ms. Taylor's arrest.*' 
(R 02088-89.) Ms. Taylor did precisely as instructed by Ms Schmid. who nevertheless 
represented to the court that Ms. Taylor had not complied with the conditions for purging. 
Moreover, once Ms. Taylor realized that Ms. Schmid could not accept delivery of 
the check within the 24-hour period, Ms. Taylor even attempted to deliver it to Mr. 
Taylors* home. Mr. Taylor now condemns her for that extra effort by stating that she 
violated a protective order in doing so. His argument reveals more of the same 
complicated web of catch-22s that has ensnared Ms. Taylor unwittingly throughout these 
3
 Although Mr. Taylor now argues that the check was not ready within 24 hours, his sole 
basis for that claim was an email from Ms. Taylor's accountant stating that it would not 
be ready until 30 minutes after the deadline. (App'ee Br. at 50.) In fact, the check was 
ready, as Ms. Taylor testified, and she made every possible effort to deliver it to Mr. 
Taylor or his counsel within the 24-hour period. Mr. Taylor therefore has no evidence to 
support his claim that the check was not ready within the time period allowed and cannot 
contradict the findings on this issue prepared by him. 
contempt proceedings. The evidence shows that she made every reasonable effort to gel 
the $41,000 check prepared by her accountant and delivered to Mr. Taylor within the 24-
hour period, but that none of her efforts were enough to satisfy him or his counsel or 
spare Ms. Taylor from a contempt ruling. Given the circumstances, there was no possible 
way that Ms. Taylor could have complied with the condition that she pay the $41.000 to 
M J . Taylor within a 24-hour period, as interpreted by Mr. Taylor. 
Second, Mi. Taylor does not dispute that he was able to obtain a passport for the 
minor child or that Ms. Taylor satisfied the condition that she obtain a passport in order 
to purge the contempt. Yet. it appears that the court did precisely that, based solely on 
the false and groundless speculation by Mr. Taylor's counsel that the "under duress" 
notation would force the State Department to reject the passport application. This 
prediction of a future event, unsupported by any admissible evidence, is not a sufficient 
basis for holding Ms. Taylor in contempt. ]t wrongly led the court to believe that Ms. 
Taylor "undid" her consent by including that notation, when in fact she correctly believed 
that the notation would have no affect whatsoever on Mr. Taylor's ability to obtain a 
passport for the younger child. The court abused its discretion in holding otherwise. 
Therefore, to the extent that the court ruled that Ms. Taylor had failed to satisfy this 
condition for purging the contempt, it did so in error. 
4
 Despite conceding that Ms. Taylor did satisfy the passport condition, Mr. Taylor 
nevertheless alleges that she signed the passport application "under duress" in order to 
"sabotage" the process. (App'ee Br. at 51.) In reality, Ms. Taylor had spoken with the 
passport office to come up with a way for her to truthfully sign a document that said she 
gave her consent to issuance of a passport when in fact she did not consent. She was told 
by the passport office that she could add "under duress" to the application without it 
14 
V]. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING CONDITIONS FOR 
PURGING THE CONTEMPT UNRELATED TO THE CONTEMPT. 
It is common sense that the court could not condition the purging of its contempt 
ruling for Ms Ta\ lor's failure to pay the $4 ] .000 debt on the entirely unrelated matter of 
obtaining a passport for the minor children. By doing so. the court made it impossible for 
Ms Taylor to purge the contempt ruling related to her failure to pay the $41
 ;000 by 
timely paying the $41,000 debt. In fact, it appears from the transcript of the February 
Hearing that that was precisely what happened. Despite having paid the debt owed, the 
district court nevertheless held Ms. Taylor in contempt after wrongfully concluding, 
based on the speculation of Mr. Taylor's counsel, that she had made it impossible for Mr. 
Taylor to obtain a passport for the youngest child. 
V1J. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING UNDULY HARSH AND 
IMPROPER SANCTIONS AGAINST MS. TAYLOR FOR CONTEMPT. 
The district court exceeded its statutory authority by sanctioning Ms. Taylor for 
contempt beyond that allowed under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-310. The award of Mr. 
Taylor's fees and costs is nowhere authorized by that governing statute. 
Mr. Taylor counters that the award of fees was warranted under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-6-311. Yet; the Court did not award fees under this statute nor did Mr. Taylor 
request fees under this statute. That statue is never even mentioned. Furthermore, 
section 78B-6-311 only authorizes a court to award fees if there is "an actual loss or 
injury to a party'5 that is "caused by the contempt." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-311; 
effecting in any way the issuance of a passport for the minor child. That is why she did 
so. Mr. Taylor's editorial comments are not supported by anything in the record and are 
instead directly contrary to fact. 
Homeyer v Stage & Assocs (In re Cannatella). 2006 UT App 89. P7 (Utah Ct App. 
2006). No findings whatsoever were made on whether there was ctany actual loss or 
injury" and whether that alleged injury was "caused by the contempt ** 
The evidence in the record does not support such findings. Mi. Taylor has not 
alleged any actual loss or injury caused by the failure to pay the $41,000 when allegedly 
owed. Attorneys* fees in and of themselves do not constitute an "actual loss or injur}7** 
triggering the awarding of fees under the statute, just as claims for actual damage under 
tort theories cannot be comprised solely of attorneys fees. Accord Neff v. Neff. 2011 UT 
6 T]87. Such an interpretation would render the statute meaningless. 
Because Mr. Taylor was not entitled to an award of fees and costs under any 
contempt statute, he is not entitled to an award of his fees and costs on appeal should he 
prevail. He is most certainly not entitled to an award of fees incurred prior to this appeal, 
including those associated with Ms. Taylor's Petition for Extraordinary Relief and 
objections filed by Ms. Taylor thereafter. There is no basis for awarding fees on appeal 
that were not directly incurred in connection with that appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court must vacate the rulings of the district 
court. 
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